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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 JAKARTA 000323

SIPDIS

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DEPT FOR EAP, EAP/MTS, EAP/MLS, EUR, EUR/SCA, IO, IO/UNP  
S/ES-O FOR KOSOVO MONITORING GROUP  
NSC FOR E.PHU

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/19/2018

TAGS: [PREL](#) [PGOV](#) [UN](#) [ID](#) [YI](#)

SUBJECT: MGKV01 -- URGING INDONESIA TO RECOGNIZE KOSOVO

REF: A. STATE 16319

[1](#)B. JAKARTA 319 AND PREVIOUS

Classified By: Pol/C Joseph Legend Novak, reasons 1.4 (b+d).

[1](#)1. (C) SUMMARY: Mission delivered latest Kosovo points to GOI contacts on February 19. Pol/C underscored the need for states to support Kosovo's independence publicly and in international fora. GOI contacts noted that Indonesia planned to continue its "wait and see" approach (see Para 7 for the official GOI statement on the matter). In the meantime, the government has come under some pressure domestically to recognize Kosovo. Our guess is that the GOI will continue to take it slow and see how the situation develops. END SUMMARY.

#### UNDERLINING USG POINTS

[1](#)2. (C) On February 19, Pol/C delivered Ref A demarche to Denny Abdi, Special Assistant to Secretary General Imron Cotan, the number two official at the Department of Foreign Affairs (DEPLU). (Note: High-level DEPLU officials were out of pocket on February 19. Mission will seek further opportunities to reach out to them.) Pol/C encouraged Indonesia to recognize Kosovo as soon as possible. Prompt recognition would signal global solidarity in responding to this security challenge. The USG and its European allies believed strongly that Kosovo was a special case and should not be seen as a precedent for other issues, and should properly be seen in the context of Yugoslavia's 15-year old break-up.

[1](#)3. (C) Abdi said Indonesia had no plans to recognize Kosovo right away and he pointed to DEPLU's statement on the matter (see Para 7). Indonesia wanted to see how developments proceeded in Southeast Europe. The whole situation was too controversial at this point, with Russia strongly opposed and China not on board. As was noted by Ambassador Cotan to the DCM last week (see Ref B), Abdi commented that it would become easier for Indonesia to recognize Kosovo as more countries did so. For example, if Indonesia heard from enough countries in the Organization of Islamic Countries (OIC), it might adjust its current position.

[1](#)4. (U) Pol/C also reviewed USG points with contacts in the Coordinating Ministry for Political, Security and Legal Affairs, and in the Indonesian national legislature (DPR).

SOME DISSONANCE AT HOME

15. (C) The GOI might be taking a "wait and see" approach, but that isn't totally popular at home. Key legislator Theo Sambuaga, the Chair of the DPR's committee for foreign affairs, publicly urged the government to support Kosovo's independence, stating: "If other former Yugoslav territories can separate, why can't Kosovo." In addition to Sambuaga (a high-level official of the secular Golkar party), members of several Islamic parties--including the PKS, PPP, and PAN--urged Indonesian government recognition. Members of the more nationalist-oriented Party of Democratic Struggle-Indonesia (PDI-P), however, came out against recognition, flagging long-standing Indonesian concerns about separatist movements.

SOME MORE TIME NEEDED

16. (C) Our guess is that the GOI will continue to take it slow and see how the situation develops. In general, the Indonesian government takes time to read the tea leaves and is very cautious. As mentioned above, however, the government is coming under some pressure domestically and President Yudhoyono's lone public statement on the matter was pretty open-ended: "If Kosovo's independence is the best for Kosovo and other nations in the world then we will be in position to support it." If all proceeds well and other countries climb on board, it is doubtful that Indonesia would want to be seen as recalcitrant on this matter (and associated with Serbia).

OFFICIAL STATEMENT

17. (U) DEPLU issued the following statement on February 18:

JAKARTA 00000323 002 OF 002

Begin text (of unofficial Embassy translation):

Statement of the Republic of Indonesia on Kosovo's Unilateral Declaration of Independence

Regarding the unilateral declaration of independence of Kosovo from Serbia on Sunday, February 17, 2008, the Government of Indonesia states the following:

-- The Government of the Republic of Indonesia fully respects the principle of National Sovereignty and Territorial Integrity of each U.N. member, which is a principal of the U.N. Charter, and International Law, as an important principle that should be respected by countries, especially developing countries that still face the challenge of nation-building.

-- Nevertheless, the Government of Indonesia is also open to seeing Kosovo's problems as part of a series of special issues faced in the former State of Federal Yugoslavia during the last 15 years, which have already resulted in new independent states.

-- From the beginning, the Government of Indonesia has joined in supporting the peaceful resolution of the Kosovo problem through dialogue and negotiation so that any agreement achieved in the process would not cause more tension or new conflicts in the Balkan region. The Government of Indonesia regrets failure of efforts to solve Kosovo's problems through dialogue and negotiation, which finally caused the unilateral declaration of independence of Kosovo.

-- The Government of Indonesia will closely follow the developments in Kosovo and is not yet in a position to recognize the unilateral declaration of independence by Kosovo. The Government of Indonesia hopes that this declaration will not cause tension and open conflict, especially with Serbia, considering that many have already become victims in the Balkan region.

Jakarta, Indonesia, February 18, 2008.

End text.

HUME